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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This appeal from a grant of summary judgment presents 
questions arising under New Jersey's "entire controversy 
doctrine" -- a body of law that has given rise to much 
litigation and a substantial body of academic commentary. 
 
I. 
 
With a view to clarifying the setting in which the 
questions on appeal are presented, we begin by describing 
the underlying controversy, and the resultant state court 
litigation, which together form the predicate for the case at 
bar. 
 
Appellant Richard Gillman was for many years a senior 
executive of Bally Manufacturing Corporation ("BMC"), and 
of Bally's Park Place, Inc. ("Park Place"), the casino 
operating arm of BMC. (In this opinion, when Park Place 
and BMC are referred to jointly, or without need to 
distinguish one from the other, they are designated"Bally"). 
In 1991 Gillman and Bally entered into Stock Option Award 
Agreements under which Gillman received options to 
purchase 1,000,000 shares of BMC and 300,000 shares of 
Bally Gaming International, Inc., a BMC subsidiary; these 
options, of very considerable potential value, were to be 
exercisable over a period of ten years. In 1992, pursuant to 
a management reorganization, it was determined that 
Gillman would leave Bally. To represent him in negotiating 
with Bally an agreement governing the terms of his 
anticipated separation, Gillman retained Waters, 
McPherson, McNeill, P.C. ("Waters, McPherson"), a New 
Jersey law firm that had for some years performed legal 
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services both for Gillman and for Bally (and that continued 
to handle some of Gillman's affairs until 1998). Kenneth D. 
McPherson, Sr. and Jack Rosen were the two Waters, 
McPherson partners who had principal responsibility for 
negotiating and drafting, on Gillman's behalf, the 
agreement pursuant to which he was to leave Bally. 
 
It was a matter of substantial importance to Gillman that 
the elaborate agreement governing his retirement from Bally 
preserve his entitlement to exercise his stock options for 
the balance of the ten-year period agreed upon by Gillman 
and Bally in 1991 -- i.e., until 2001. On January 8, 1993, 
Gillman executed the Retirement and Separation 
Agreement, and, simultaneously, retired. Gillman, 
according to his later testimony, understood that the 
Retirement and Separation Agreement protected the ten- 
year entitlement to exercise the stock options. However, 
when, on January 24, 1994, Gillman undertook to exercise 
options for the purchase of 100,000 Bally shares, he was 
informed by Bally that his unexercised options had expired 
on January 8, 1994, the first anniversary of his retirement. 
(Bally's position was that (a) Gillman's Stock Option Award 
Agreements provided that a Bally employee had a ten-year 
purchase window for the exercise of vested options but that 
a retired employee's purchase window was only one year, 
and (b) the Retirement and Separation Agreement"vested" 
Gillman's option rights as of the date of his retirement and 
provided that exercise of those vested rights was to be "in 
accordance with the applicable provisions" of the Stock 
Option Award Agreements -- hence, one year.) 
 
In March of 1994 -- two months after Bally refused to 
honor Gillman's stock options -- Gillman filed suit against 
Bally in the New Jersey Superior Court to enforce his 
claimed stock option rights. Gillman was represented by 
Frederic K. Becker, a partner in the New Jersey firm of 
Wilentz, Goldman, Spitzer, P.C.; McPherson and Rosen 
advised Becker, and Rosen supplied an affidavit supporting 
Gillman's claims. On July 18, 1994, while Gillman's suit 
was pending in the Superior Court, Becker wrote Gillman a 
letter recapitulating a June 30 conference: 
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       PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL 
 
       July 18, 1994 
 
       Mr. Richard Gillman 
       c/o Waters, McPherson, McNeill 
       300 Lighting Way 
       Secaucus, NJ 07096 
 
       Re: Gillman v. Bally Manufacturing Corporation, et al. 
 
       Dear Dick: 
 
        This will confirm the matters discussed and agreed 
       upon when Roger Kaplan and I met with you on June 
       30, 1994, with respect to certain issues raised by the 
       above-referenced litigation. 
 
        As you had previously discussed with Kenneth D. 
       McPherson, Sr., the fact that you have been required to 
       institute suit against Bally Manufacturing Corporation 
       and Bally's Park Place, Inc. raises certain issues 
       regarding claims that you may have against the firms 
       of Waters, McPherson, McNeill and Shereff, Friedman, 
       Hoffman & Goodman for professional malpractice in 
       connection with representing your interests relevant to 
       your Retirement and Separation Agreement, and the 
       exercise of your options, which are the subject of the 
       above-referenced litigation: (a) in the negotiation of 
       your Retirement and Separation Agreement (specifically 
       in connection with Section 2(d) of that Agreement, as it 
       relates to the "Retirement" paragraphs of the Option 
       Agreements); and (b) in connection with advising you 
       as to the potential effect of Section 2(d) of the 
       Retirement and Separation Agreement, insofar as that 
       section might, when read with the relevant provisions 
       of the Option Agreements, cause your options to 
       terminate within one year. 
 
        A recent decision in New Jersey suggests that any 
       such claims for professional malpractice are presently 
       ripe and assertable by you by reason of the fact that 
       you have already incurred an injury and damages 
       arising from the need to pursue litigation against Bally 
       Manufacturing and Bally's Park Place, causing the 
       expenditure of sums for attorneys' fees and litigation 
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       costs, and that you need not wait to assert such claims 
       until after the conclusion of the litigation with Bally 
       Manufacturing and Bally's Park Place. 
 
        Moreover, given that such claims would likely be 
       presently assertable, the New Jersey courts have a 
       requirement under what is called the "entire 
       controversy doctrine," that all claims against all parties 
       relating to the same controversy or subject matter 
       should be asserted in a single litigation or, if not 
       asserted, be forever barred and precluded in the future. 
       As a result, if these potential claims for professional 
       malpractice are not now asserted in the present 
       litigation with Bally Manufacturing and Bally's Park 
       Place, such claims would, in all likelihood, be barred 
       and precluded from being asserted by you in the 
       future. If such claims were to be asserted in the 
       pending litigation, the Court might (or might not) 
       decide to separate these claims from the claims against 
       Bally Manufacturing and Bally's Park Place, but we 
       would expect that Bally would argue against the 
       severance of such claims and would argue that the 
       attorney-client privilege was waived by you by suing 
       your own attorneys, thereby possibly opening up for 
       discovery your confidential or attorney-client 
       communications with these law firms. 
 
        You told us that you had a similar conversation with 
       Kenneth D. McPherson, Sr., and had given the subject 
       a considerable amount of reflection and consideration 
       in the past. You also told us that you were of the view 
       that you did not want to pursue a claim against these 
       law firms, notwithstanding the fact that the failure to 
       assert the claims now would likely make it impossible 
       to assert the claims at a later date. 
 
        As a result of your determination not to assert any 
       claims against either Waters, McPherson, McNeill or 
       Shereff, Friedman, Hoffman & Goodman, we will not, 
       as we advised you, take any action to protect or 
       preserve your interests in asserting any claims against 
       either of these firms. 
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        Please call me if you have any questions or if you 
       want to discuss further any issues addressed by this 
       letter. 
 
       Sincerely, 
       FREDERIC K. BECKER 
 
       FKB:ald 
 
It appears that the June 30 conference and the July 18 
letter were responsive to the February 16, 1994 decision of 
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court in Circle 
Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 274 N.J. 
Super. 405 (App. Div. 1994), holding that attorney 
malpractice claims were one of the categories of claims 
embraced by the entire controversy doctrine, with the result 
that non-inclusion in an underlying action of claims of 
attorney malpractice that, putatively, gave rise to the 
necessity of the underlying action, might result in 
preclusion of such claims. Notwithstanding Becker's July 
18 letter, Gillman did not alter the position he appears to 
have taken in the June 30 conference -- namely, that he 
would not authorize enlarging the scope of the Bally suit by 
adding malpractice claims against Waters, McPherson. 
 
On August 23, 1994, Judge Margolis, Presiding Judge of 
the Chancery Division of the Superior Court, granted 
Bally's motion for summary judgment and denied Gillman's 
motions for partial summary judgment. In the concluding 
pages (pages 20-22) of his opinion, Judge Margolis wrote as 
follows: 
 
        Gillman's retirement from Bally was governed by a 
       Retirement and Separation Agreement that 
       incorporated other agreements by reference. Pursuant 
       to the terms of those agreements, Gillman had one year 
       within which to exercise his options. For whatever 
       reason, Gillman failed to do so. Although Gillman 
       thereby sustained significant monetary losses, he 
       executed a contract that was negotiated at arm's length 
       by competent counsel. 
 
       . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
 
       . . . . [G]illman was represented by competent counsel 
       at all relevant times -- he was a sophisticated 
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       businessman upon whose behalf a detailed agreement 
       was negotiated. . . . [I]f Gillman was not aware of the 
       option exercise date, his counsel was, or should have 
       been. 
 
Gillman appealed. While Gillman's appeal was pending, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate 
Division's ruling in Circle Chevrolet that attorney 
malpractice claims were subject to the entire controversy 
doctrine. Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & 
Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995). On Gillman's 
appeal, Kenneth McPherson, Jr., of Waters, McPherson 
joined Frederic Becker as counsel of record. 
 
The Appellate Division affirmed Judge Margolis's grant of 
summary judgment. "The trial court properly enforced the 
express, bargained-for terms of his Option Agreement and 
Retirement and Separation Agreement, and refused to grant 
plaintiff equitable relief from the consequences of his and 
his counsel's neglect." Gillman v. Bally Mg. Corp., 286 N.J. 
Super. 523, 531, 670 A.2d 19 (N.J. App. Div. 1996). 
 
The decision of the Appellate Division was handed down 
on January 4, 1996. 
 
On January 20, 1996, Jack Rosen died. 
 
On March 20, 1996 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
denied certification. 144 N.J. 174, 675 A.2d 1122 (1996). 
 
II. 
 
As Gillman's unsuccessful litigation against Bally made 
its way through the courts of New Jersey between 1994 and 
1996, it was paralleled by the Circle Chevrolet  litigation in 
which the Appellate Division in 1994 announced, and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in 1995 confirmed, that New 
Jersey's entire controversy doctrine embraced attorney 
malpractice claims. The entire controversy doctrine has not 
been a favorite of the New Jersey bar, and its extension to 
attorney malpractice claims was not widely acclaimed. 
". . . [T]he failure to exclude legal malpractice claims from 
the Entire Controversy doctrine . . . harms attorneys, 
clients, and the legal system itself. The sooner our Supreme 
Court reconsiders its opinion in this matter, the better off 
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we will all be." Albert L. Cohn and Terri Smith, Practice and 
Malpractice after Circle Chevrolet: Some Practical 
Considerations of the Entire Controversy Doctrine , 28 
Rutgers L. J. 79, 84-85 (1996). Academic criticism of Circle 
Chevrolet tended to be more restrained. As Professor 
Hazard put it, "Why, in the name of any conception of 
justice and good order, should a client engaged in a 
complicated, expensive and protracted controversy with an 
opposing party be required to enlarge and complicate that 
litigation, perhaps with fatal effects on its merits, by 
extending the attack to his own lawyer in the middle of the 
proceeding?" Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Before and Behind the 
"Entire Controversy" Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L. J. 7, 24 (1996). 
 
In 1997 the New Jersey Supreme Court did "reconsider 
its opinion." The court's new ruling was announced in Olds 
v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 696 A. 2d 633 (1997). The court 
stated that (1) "[w]e are aware of the criticism of Circle 
Chevrolet's expansion of the entire controversy doctrine to 
attorney-malpractice actions," 696 A. 2d at 641, (2) 
"[c]andor compels that we acknowledge that the application 
of the entire controversy doctrine to legal-malpractice 
claims has not fulfilled our expectations," ibid., and (3) "[i]n 
sum, we conclude that the entire controversy doctrine no 
longer compels the assertion of a legal-malpractice claim in 
an underlying action that gives rise to the claim." Id. at 
643. 
 
In January of 1999, Gillman (formerly a citizen of New 
Jersey, but now a citizen of Florida) filed the instant 
diversity action in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey. The named defendants were Waters, 
McPherson and the Estate of Jack Rosen (the Waters, 
McPherson partner who, together with Kenneth McPherson, 
Sr., had represented Gillman in negotiating and drafting 
the Separation Agreement). The suit -- initiated a year-and- 
a-half after Circle Chevrolet was overruled by Olds -- 
alleged malpractice. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment. Gillman 
filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The 
District Court granted defendants' motion. In its 
Memorandum and Order the District Court first addressed 
the question "whether the Court should apply the short- 
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lived legal malpractice claim preclusion rule articulated by 
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, in early 
1994, adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Circle 
Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 
(1995), and overruled two years later in Olds v. Donnelly, 
150 N.J. 424 (1997)." Memorandum and Order, p. 8. The 
District Court's analysis was as follows: 
 
        In abrogating Circle Chevrolet, the Olds court 
       contemplated the extent of retroactive effect it should 
       give to its decision and specifically held that the 
       decision should be given "limited or `pipeline' 
       retroactivity" rather than full retroactive effect. See 
       [150 N.J.] at 449. The court explained that its decision 
       should apply to cases in the litigation "pipeline," that 
       is, "all pending cases, whether on appeal or in the trial 
       courts." Id. . . 
 
        Gillman argues that because this malpractice action 
       was filed after the Olds ruling, it is governed by Olds 
       and not by Circle Chevrolet, and thus the ECD [entire 
       controversy doctrine] would not bar his legal 
       malpractice claim for failure to have joined it in the 
       prior state court action. Gillman's legal theory would 
       grant full retroactive effect to the Olds decision such 
       that all attorney malpractice claims that had accrued 
       under Circle Chevrolet and that were not yet time- 
       barred would be resurrected. This interpretation would 
       render meaningless the plain words of the New Jersey 
       Supreme Court's decision regarding retroactivity. In 
       holding that legal malpractice claims were no longer 
       subject to the ECD, the court plainly stated that the 
       Olds decision would be accorded only limited 
       retroactive effect such that cases already in the 
       litigation pipeline -- cases "on appeal or in the trial 
       courts" -- would receive the benefit of the new rule. 
       Necessarily, cases that were not yet pending in the trial 
       courts or on appeal, thus not in the pipeline, would not 
       receive the benefit of the Olds abrogation of Circle 
       Chevrolet. Claims that accrued under Circle Chevrolet 
       and that were not in the pipeline at the time of the 
       Olds decision on July 16, 1997 are clearly subject to 
       the Circle Chevrolet rule, not the Olds  rule. 
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        Gillman's legal malpractice claim accrued long before 
       the Olds decision. At the latest, Gillman knew that he 
       had a potential malpractice claim against Waters, 
       McPherson when he received the July 18, 1994 letter 
       from Becker explaining the claim-preclusive effect that 
       the ECD could have on any potential legal malpractice 
       claim Gillman might want to assert against Waters, 
       McPherson. 
 
Memorandum and Order, pp. 10-11 (footnote omitted). 
 
Toward the close of its Memorandum and Order, the 
District Court stated an alternate ground for its grant of 
summary judgment: 
 
        Furthermore, the Court does not view Gillman as an 
       unsuspecting victim of the ECD's claim-preclusive 
       impact. He was fully informed by his attorney during 
       the pendency of his state court action that he must 
       assert any potential legal malpractice claim against 
       Waters, McPherson at that time and he did not. Quite 
       the contrary, he assured his attorneys that he would 
       not assert a malpractice claim against them in the 
       pending state court action. Thereby, Gillman 
       voluntarily surrendered a known right. Accordingly, 
       even in the absence of the Circle Chevrolet ruling 
       Gillman's claim could be barred under the doctrine of 
       waiver. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
In approaching the question whether the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment was warranted, we first 
consider the District Court's assessment of the limited 
retroactive effect of Olds. The District Court, it will be 
recalled, observed that "Gillman's legal theory would grant 
full retroactive effect to the Olds decision such that all 
attorney malpractice claims that had accrued under Circle 
Chevrolet and that were not yet time-barred would be 
resurrected," and stated that "[t]his interpretation would 
render meaningless the plain words of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's decision regarding retroactivity," since 
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"the court plainly stated that the Olds decision would be 
accorded only limited retroactive effect such that cases 
already in the litigation pipeline -- `cases on appeal or in 
the trial courts' -- would receive the benefit of the new 
rule." 
 
This meant, so the District Court reasoned, that cases 
"that were not in the pipeline at the time of the Olds 
decision on July 16, 1997 are clearly subject to the Circle 
Chevrolet rule, not the Olds rule." And, since Gillman's suit, 
although arising out of events that transpired during the 
Circle Chevrolet era, was not initiated until 1999, and hence 
was not pending on July 16, 1997, it was, under the 
District Court's analysis of the Olds court's pronouncement 
with respect to the limited retroactive impact of its decision, 
barred by Circle Chevrolet. 
 
To assess the correctness of the District Court's analysis, 
we set forth in full the Olds court's discussion of 
retroactivity: 
 
        The parties have not briefed or argued the issue 
       whether the within decision should apply retroactively 
       or prospectively. In fairness to other litigants and the 
       judicial system, however, we conclude that our decision 
       should apply not only to the present case, but to all 
       pending cases, whether on appeal or in the trial courts. 
 
        Ordinarily, judicial decisions apply retroactively. 
       Crespo v. Stapf, 128 N.J. 351, 367, 608 A.2d 241 
       (1992). Policy considerations may justify giving a 
       decision limited retroactive effect. Id. The first 
       consideration is whether litigants reasonably have 
       relied on settled law in ordering their affairs. Id. at 368. 
       Another consideration is whether retroactive 
       application will advance the purposes of the rule 
       announced in the decision. Id. at 370. "The final 
       consideration is whether retroactive application would 
       produce inequitable results and adversely affect the 
       administration of justice." Id. at 371. 
 
        Here, those considerations point toward limited or 
       "pipeline" retroactivity of our decision. First, we decided 
       Circle Chevrolet only two years ago, a factor that affects 
       the extent to which litigants reasonably have relied on 
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       the application of the entire controversy doctrine to 
       legal-malpractice claims. Second, the general purpose 
       of the legal-malpractice exception is to preserve the 
       attorney-client relationship. Limited retroactivity will 
       adequately protect existing relationships. Giving the 
       benefit of our decision to litigants with pending cases 
       serves the interests of justice by permitting resolution 
       of their claims on the merits. Complete retroactivity, 
       however, potentially would expose the judicial system 
       to the undue burden of resolving numerous concluded 
       matters. 
 
696 A.2d at 646. 
 
In applying the Olds rule of "limited or`pipeline' 
retroactivity" to Gillman's suit, the District Court ruled that 
Gillman's suit was not yet in the "pipeline" when Olds was 
decided and hence was barred. We agree with the District 
Court that Gillman's suit, not filed until 1999, was not in 
the pipeline on July 16, 1997, when Olds was decided. But 
we do not agree that the Olds court, in clothing its ruling 
with "limited or `pipeline' retroactivity," meant by the use of 
that phrase to exclude from the coverage of Olds  a suit filed 
subsequent to July 16, 1997 (provided, of course, that the 
suit was filed within the applicable six-year statute of 
limitations, as Gillman's was). We think that in determining 
that its new rule was to have " `pipeline' retroactivity," the 
court in Olds signified that it was selecting from available 
options the rule of limited retroactivity which the court had 
described and applied just a year before, in State of New 
Jersey v. Knight, 678 A. 2d 642 (1996). In Knight the court 
explained that to "give [a] new rule `pipeline retroactivity,' " 
is to "render[ ] it applicable in all future cases, the case in 
which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct 
appeal." Id. at 651. "[P]ipeline retroactivity" was contrasted 
by the Knight court with "complete retroactive effect" which 
involves "applying [the new rule] to all cases, including 
those in which final judgments have been entered and all 
other avenues of appeal have been exhausted." Ibid. 
 
Viewing Gillman's malpractice suit through the prism of 
"pipeline retroactivity" as deployed in Knight and in Olds, it 
falls within the category of what Knight termed "future 
cases." 678 A. 2d at 651. Thus, we think that, if the New 
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Jersey Supreme Court were today to have occasion to 
address a suit like Gillman's malpractice suit against 
Waters, McPherson and the Rosen Estate -- a suit which 
was not in fact filed until after Olds was decided, but a suit 
which could have been filed during the brief hegemony of 
Circle Chevrolet and which would then have properly been 
found by the lower courts of New Jersey to be non- 
cognizable -- the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule 
that such a suit was governed by Olds. 
 
In predicting how the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
rule, we do not confine ourselves to a textual 
deconstruction of the term "pipeline retroactivity." We are 
also guided by the three-factor inquiry on which that court 
has long relied in determining the scope of retroactive 
application of a new rule. See, e.g., Fischer v. Canario, 143 
N.J. 235, 244-245, 670 A.2d 516, 521 (1996). As the court 
explained in Fischer a year before Olds  was decided, "the 
competing considerations in each case are weighed by 
examining the following three factors: (1) the purpose of the 
new rule and whether it would be advanced by retroactive 
application; (2) the reliance placed on the old rule by the 
parties and the community; and (3) the effect that 
retroactive application would have on the administration of 
justice." Ibid., citing Rutherford Educ. Ass'n. v. Rutherford 
Bd. of Educ., 99 N.J. 8, 22, 489 A.2d 1148 (1985), and 
State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406, 427 A.2d 525 (1981). 
 
First, we consider the purpose of the Olds rule and 
inquire whether that purpose would be effectuated by 
applying it to Gillman's situation. Three purposes may be 
said to support the Olds rule: to preserve the sanctity of the 
attorney-client relationship, to foster judicial efficiency, and 
to increase fairness. All three are well served by extending 
the Olds rule to Gillman's situation: (1) The Olds rule is 
protective of the attorney-client relationship in that it 
permits a client to avoid what Circle Chevrolet  appeared to 
mandate: undermining a current attorney-client 
relationship by joining the lawyer as a malpractice 
defendant in underlying litigation. (2) The Olds  rule 
promotes judicial efficiency by obviating the necessity of 
enlarging and complicating the underlying litigation 
through the addition of a malpractice claim before the 
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plaintiff can ascertain whether the result in the underlying 
litigation renders the malpractice claim unnecessary. (3) 
The rule relieves a client of the Hobson's Choice, imposed 
by Circle Chevrolet, of, on the one hand, surrendering the 
attorney-client privilege by adding a claim for malpractice 
in the underlying litigation, or on the other hand, 
surrendering the right to pursue a malpractice claim in the 
future. 
 
Second, we consider the extent to which the parties and 
the larger community may have relied on the rule the Olds 
court jettisoned. As the Olds court concluded, the Circle 
Chevrolet rule was of such short duration -- only two years 
-- as to encourage little reliance. Moreover, criticism and 
calls for the overruling of Circle Chevrolet were so 
immediate and so vehement that any reliance thereon could 
only have been tentative. 
 
Third, we consider the impact of retroactive application of 
the new rule on the administration of justice. We think that 
bringing within the ambit of Olds those cases, like the case 
at bar, in which the cause of action had accrued, but no 
claim had been filed, when Olds was decided, would not be 
detrimental to the administration of justice because it 
would not involve the reopening of cases that had been fully 
adjudicated. Furthermore, the Olds rule promotes the 
resolution of attorney malpractice claims on the merits, 
rather than on the basis of the arcane procedural 
jurisprudence spawned by Circle Chevrolet. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the "pipeline retroactivity" 
called for by the Olds court requires the application of Olds 
to Gillman's claim. 
 
B. 
 
We turn now to the District Court's alternate ground for 
granting summary judgment: Gillman, so the District Court 
put it, "assured his attorneys that he would not assert a 
malpractice claim against them in the pending state court 
action. Thereby, Gillman voluntarily surrendered a known 
right. Accordingly, even in the absence of the Circle 
Chevrolet ruling, Gillman's claim could be barred under the 
doctrine of waiver." 
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Some of the evidence before the District Court lent 
support to a finding that Gillman knowingly and 
intelligently disavowed any thought of suing Waters, 
McPherson. But other evidence cut in a different direction. 
In his sworn declaration submitted in opposition to 
defendants' summary judgment motion, Gillman described 
the difficult choice he confronted when Becker told him 
about the potential impact of the entire controversy 
doctrine. "Faced with the dilemma, I accepted the 
assurances I received from McPherson and Rosen that my 
position in the Bally Litigation would prevail, and that the 
Court would conclude that I had ten years to exercise my 
options. It appeared to be against my best interests to add 
Waters, McPherson to the Bally Litigation (thereby waiving 
my attorney-client privilege) especially since none of my 
attorneys suggested that I even had a claim against Waters, 
McPherson. To this day, McPherson has denied that his 
firm was negligent [citing deposition testimony of Kenneth 
McPherson, Sr.]." Gillman Declaration, paragraph 31. 
Further, according to Gillman, "I never waived or 
relinquished my rights to file a claim against Waters, 
McPherson. Nor did I ever inform Mr. Becker or anyone at 
Waters, McPherson that I had waived or relinquished any 
claims that I had against the firm. During those years, I 
merely accepted the assurances that McPherson and Rosen 
repeatedly gave me that I would prevail in the Bally 
Litigation and mindful of the advice Mr. Becker gave me 
that joining Waters, McPherson would create serious 
tactical problems, determined not to join Waters, 
McPherson as a defendant in the Bally Litigation which 
would have required me to sever my attorney-client 
relationship with the firm." 
 
With the record in this posture, a grant of summary 
judgment on the issue of waiver was inappropriate."Waiver, 
under New Jersey law, involves the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right, and thus it must be 
shown that the party charged with waiver knew of his or 
her legal rights and deliberately intended to relinquish 
them . . . Questions of waiver, therefore, are usually 
questions of intent, which are factual determinations that 
should not be made on a motion for summary judgment." 
Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 
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384 (N.J. 1988); accord, Garden State Buildings, L.P., v. 
First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1325 (N.J. Super. 
1997).1 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the District 
Court is reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It may be added that the complexity of establishing "that the party 
charged with waiver knew of his or her legal rights and deliberately 
intended to relinquish them" is significantly compounded in a setting, 
such as that presented in the case at bar, in which the legal principles 
that constitute the framework within which a choice is to be made, while 
seemingly valid at the time of the choice, are subsequently undercut by 
later case law. 
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